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                                                                   Abstract 
 
Title of the Thesis: Anti-drug strategies in Afghanistan: with a special emphasis on alternative 
development programmes. 
 
 
Purpose: To suggest international community how to decrease the level of opium cultivation in 
Afghanistan through implementation of the most effective alternative development programmes to 
the region.  
 
Conclusion: Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. The infrastructure of the 
country is underdeveloped. Furthermore, the level of opium cultivation in Afghanistan is the highest 
in the world. The economy of the country is mostly illicit, and opium contributes a lot towards its 
Gross Domestic Product. Insecure state and high level of poppy cultivation are very much 
connected. Afghan farmers are involved in production of opium, because the income received for 
poppy cannot be compared to income received for cultivation of other crops. In turn, this causes a 
violation of human rights in Afghanistan, global trafficking of opium and high-level of heroin 
addicts all over the Globe. These problems have become especially topical today, because last year 
Afghanistan had reached the highest level of opium cultivation in its modern history. In order to 
reduce the high level of poppy crops cultivation the Government of Afghanistan in cooperation with 
international actors such as the U.S. Government, British Government, European Union and United 
Nations have undertaken various counter narcotic measures, such as eradication, interdiction and 
implementation of alternative livelihoods. As many scholars argue, most of the counter narcotic 
measures have been ineffective. Alternative development programmes did not bring the same effect 
in every province they were implemented in. They were successful in some regions and failed in 
others. In my research I give an overview of the anti-drug policies in Afghanistan with a focus on 
alternative development. I analyze the alternative development programmes which have been most 
effective and suggest the programmes which, in my opinion, could become effective in conditions of 
modern Afghanistan. I suggest that actors implementing alternative development programmes 
should take into consideration the conditions of every province, as factors influencing on success or 
failure of alternative development strategies differ from province to province. 
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I. Introduction 
 
1.1. Thesis Motivation 
 
My research focuses on anti-drug policies with a special emphasis on alternative development 
measures in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. Afghanistan is extremely poor and the country‗s economy 
is unstable and illicit. The country is primarily agricultural and has a long history of poppy 
cultivation. Today more and more farmers turn to growing opium because it brings them higher 
income. Opium is the biggest threat to the health of people of the region and is the cause of the 
economic instability, social unrest and conflicts. Moreover, Afghan opium is seen as a threat not 
only to the countries of South Asia, but also to the whole world, as it is being consumed by many 
countries. Since opium is the most profitable crop to grow by the Afghan farmers, they would 
probably continue growing it until the opium is removed and an alternative is found.  Afghanistan is 
a case that needs to be studied carefully. It is necessary to find the best ways and solutions of know-
how to help Afghanistan to switch from illicit crop to licit. Furthermore, for achieving this goal it is 
essential to improve the state-building processes in Afghanistan. Today, the infrastructure of the 
country is underdeveloped. In addition, there are many terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan and 
controlling the opium fields. Undeveloped state, terrorist groups such as Taliban, insecurity, 
ineffectiveness of anti-drug measures can increase activities of farmers on poppy fields and result in 
country‘s illicit economy. 
 
I believe that implementing anti-drug measures in combination with securitization of state, 
including the fight against terrorism could probably bring positive outcomes in future. However, in 
order to understand what kind of anti-drug measures could be the most successful in the region it is 
essential to keep in mind several factors, which are combination of knowledge in geography, 
history, economy and political science. Based on analysis of all these factors the best anti-drug 
policy in the country can be implemented. These factors are: 
 
1. Geopolitical determinant. There are certain regions with a highest concentration of drug 
production. Such regions are ― ―Golden Crescent‖ (Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan), the ―Golden 
Triangle‖ (Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand) and the ―Andes Triangle‖ (Peru, Bolivia, and Columbia). 
Among the main characteristics of these regions are the following: underdeveloped political system, 
existence of uncontrolled land for agriculture (i.e., Afghanistan, Laos, Columbia and Peru); 
 
2. Social-economical determinant. Social-economic problems lead to the development of drug 
cultivation and trafficking. The reason of that is insecure society, high concentration of belligerent 
groups and luck of alternative development programmes in poor rural areas in certain countries 
where the cultivation of illicit drugs are high (i.e., Afghanistan, Columbia); 
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3. Corruption. Corrupted government bodies, politics and army would help the drug Mafia to reach 
the high level of influence. This factor should be of high importance for the bodies intending to 
fund programmes of alternative development. 
 
Afghanistan is among the ―Golden Crescent‗s‖ countries. It is insecure and highly corrupted. 
Afghan Government is trying to solve all the social-economic problems and develop its anti-drug 
policy. However, there are some problems that would be difficult to solve without help of 
International actors. International community should keep developing the anti-drug policy and 
cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan in order to find solutions to the different topical 
problems connected with the consumption and production of illicit drugs in Afghanistan. 
 
In my work I am focusing on alternative development policies in Afghanistan and analyzing 
effectiveness of different programmes implemented by various actors to the poorest rural regions of 
the country with the high level of opium cultivation. I believe that by implementing the alternative 
development programs in certain regions, international community can solve one of the main 
problems connected to the factor of drug production mentioned above – social-economic factors. As 
many scholars argue, most of the counter-narcotic measures implemented to Afghanistan have not 
been effective. I believe that eradication or interdiction will not impact the root cause of the 
problem. Since the economy of the country is very much dependent on illicit crop, it is essential not 
just to remove poppy from the field, but to provide farmers with activities that would bring them 
sufficient income. In addition, anti-drug policies should be combined with the processes of 
securitization. Alternative development programmes are being implemented to the poorest regions 
where people do not have any other opportunity to gain money rather than cultivate illicit crops. 
The reason of choosing a particular case study can be explained by the fact that today‗s Afghanistan 
is a country with the growing level of opium cultivation. The problem is very topical and at the 
same time is very young, because the interventions have started only 13 years ago and debate 
whether anti-drug policies would help Afghanistan to become a secure state not based on primarily 
illicit economy is still ongoing. In my work, I am addressing the challenges of this topic by 
discussing sources and theories, exploring different angels of the problem, analyzing existing 
literature and theoretical approaches on the topic.  
 
1.2. Research Questions 
 
Illicit economy of drugs in Afghanistan has a strong connection with democratization and 
securitization processes of the state.  As scholars have proposed, when fighting against drugs and 
their cultivation it is essential to improve social-economic situation of the country and to build 
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infrastructure. Implementation of alternative development programmes alone will not be successful 
without state building processes. Moreover, an unstable country with underdeveloped infrastructure 
is a good soil for growth of insurgent groups such as Taliban. These conditions are especially 
dangerous for a country with the highest level of poppy cultivation, as it leads to cooperation of 
Afghan farmers with Taliban. According to Felbab-Brown‘s ―political capital model of illicit 
economies‖ approach, there is a connection between the ―leaders‖ of drug industry in Afghanistan 
(Taliban) and society (farmers). People cannot fully control their fields and often are following 
instructions of Taliban. Income received after cultivation and trafficking of Afghan opium is very 
high and brings in a lot of money to country‘s illicit economy. As Felbab-Brown argues, one of the 
main features of illicit market is high income (Felbab Brown, 2009a). As most of the Afghan 
farmers are very poor and Afghanistan is underdeveloped country, it is quite difficult for farmers to 
find other kinds of legal activities which would bring them they same income as cultivation of 
poppy. 
 
However, as I develop it in my Thesis, some anti-drug measures implemented by international 
actors at some point can become a key solution of social-economic problems in Afghanistan caused 
by illicit economy of poppy. There have been a lot of criticism and debate concerning most of the 
anti-drug policies implemented to Afghanistan (mainly eradication and interdiction). According to 
empirical findings, theories and statistics that have been compared and analyzed during my work on 
thesis, the most effective anti-drug measure in some provinces seemed to be implementation of 
some kinds of alternative livelihoods. It can be argued, though, that alternative development 
strategies did not bring equal result in every province they were implemented to. Although the 
general statistics point on a very poor and underdeveloped Afghan state, data within the country is 
quite different. For example, some Northern provinces were very successful fighting opium 
cultivation, while Southern provinces did not. The conditions influencing on success or failure of 
certain anti-drug measures in various Afghan provinces are developed further in my research. 
 
In order to understand how anti-drug policies implemented in Afghanistan helped to fight opium 
(the main reason of insecurity) and on basis of Felbab-Brown‘s approach and literature review, I am 
positioning and formulating the following research question: 
 
1) Why anti-drug measures and in particularly alternative development strategies implemented to 
Afghanistan have been effective in some provinces and did not bring visible success in other? 
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II. Methodology 
 
2.1. Data Collection 
 
 
Data collection is a very important component of the research that aims to gather facts in order to 
make a logic conclusion. The data collection of my thesis project based initially on a second hand 
data. It consists of secondary interviews, academic books, articles, reports of International 
Organizations, videos, magazines and newspapers. The previous done research helps to understand 
the topic in depth and make analysis and conclusions based on this research. There are several key 
authors and reports, which are necessary to study in order to make a project on anti-drug policies in 
Afghanistan. In the current chapter I give an overview of the sources and empirical literature I use 
in order to find an answer to research questions of the Thesis. 
 
In the following chapter, I give more detailed overview of literature, comparing the point of view of 
different authors on the international anti-drug policy. Additionally to other sources, the reports of 
International Organizations are very important in my research. 
 
The key reports are the following: ―World Drug Report 2013‖ (UNODC 2013), ―Afghanistan: 
Mapping of Alternative Livelihood programmes‖ (UNODC, 2005), Afghanistan Opium Rapid 
Assessment Survey (UNODC, 2005), ―Afghanistan Opium Survey‖ (UNODC, 2005, 2009, 2013). 
In particularly, one of the most important sources of my research is series of ―Afghanistan Opium 
Survey‖ reports of the UNODC. In order to analyze dynamics of the opium cultivation level during 
years 2005, 2009, 2014 in each province, I compare statistical data of the reports and accurately 
identify the regions where implementation of alternative development programmes succeed or 
failed.  
 
For giving better overview of the projects and statistics I am using databases of different actors, 
such as Government of Afghanistan, USAID and European Union. The main disadvantage of the 
databases though is that they are not regularly updated. One of the biggest is the UNODC 
Alternative Livelihoods Database with more than 100 projects. There are also a number of 
databases on different projects in Afghanistan created by Afghan Government. Such databases are: 
1) Ministry of Finance‗s DAD (Donor Assistance Database). It was created in order to track flows 
in Afghanistan (financial information); 2) Management Information System (MIS) (by Ministry of 
Rural rehabilitation and Development). Database uses to consolidate information on five main 
national projects. The information is mostly technical and includes data on projects, although it 
highlights their strengths and weaknesses. Most of the reports do not make assessment of the 
alternative livelihoods project, but give their overview. However, some of the reports are being 
critic towards alternative development programmes. For example, ―Afghanistan Opium Rapid 
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Assessment Survey‖ (UNODC, 2005a) gives the reasons of common causes of mistrust and 
negative outcomes of alternative livelihoods: 
1. Lack of consensus with the participants in the selection of alternatives and strategies; 
2. Haste to achieve or show results at the expense of good development practices; 
3. Eradication of coca bush prior to the establishment of viable alternatives; 
4. Prioritization of coca bush reduction over the welfare of farmer-producers; 
5. Unkept promises to local producers; 
6. Poor technical support for alternatives; 
7. Lack of donor and government transparency in the management of resources; 
8. Promotion of alternatives that are not sustainable (for varying reasons); 
9. Unreliable markets for alternative products; 
10. Inadequate participation of local farmers, local leaders and local organizations. 
 
Sometimes authors of the reports are being positive about ideas of alternative development 
implementation. For example, Boonwaat beliefs that Alternative Development in PDR Lao could be 
easily achievable: ―contrary to popular belief, communities with opium are among the poorest in 
Lao PDR. The annual national opium poppy survey of 2003 estimates that an average opium farmer 
receives US$ 88 from opium poppy cultivation activities out of annual income of about US$ 205. 
This is roughly equivalent to income that could be generated from the sale of a calf, one ton of rice, 
a couple of pigs, fifty chicken or two pieces of woven silk. This is easily achievable‖ ( Boonwaat 
2004a). 
 
For my research I studied works of various scholars who are experts in the field of anti-drug policy 
in Afghanistan. In the Chapter III I give detailed overview of the critics and positive opinions on 
topic. Among the key authors are the following: V. Felbab-Brown, W. Byrd, C. Ward, A. Guistozzi, 
Snesarev ( Снесарёв), Popov (Попов). 
 
In order to understand the reasons of regional variation in the success and failure rate of alternative 
development programmes, I analyze ―political capital model of illicit economies‖ approach which 
V. Felbab- Brown develops in her ―Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs‖ book.  
She believes that implementation of alternative development programmes will not bring visible 
success in conditions of insecure state. The province of Hilmand is an example of the region where 
alternative development programmes did not succeed due to insecurity caused by conflicts. 
Furthermore, conflict caused sympathy of local population towards insurgent groups, which 
strenghthed positions of Taliban in the region, in accordance with the Felbab-Brown‘s approach.  
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Additionally, not only implementation of hard power by International coalition in Hilmand 
influenced political capital of insurgents, but also eradication measures as a counter-narcotics 
strategy of British forces (Farrel, Giustozzi 2013a). This aligns with the Felbab- Brown‘s approach 
as eradication measures became one of the reasons of Taliban‘s support by local farmers.  On the 
basis of this data it can be assumed that alternative development projects in provinces with high 
level of insecurity did not bring visible success. 
 
Some of the programmes that seem to be successful may fail due to security conditions. In the 
―Responding to Afghanistan’s Opium Economy Challenge: Lessons and Policy Implications from a 
development Perspective‖ article, W. Byrd notes that the programme of licensing Afghan opium 
will not be successful initially because of insecurity in some provinces. 
 
Furthermore, many authors indicate on geographical location of some Afghan provinces as the 
reason of insecurity and growing level of drug-trafficking. Franco and Giustozzi (2013) in the 
article ―The evolution of Taliban command and control” note that positions of Questa and Peshawar 
(which are important for the Taliban movement cities in Pakistan) influence on Taliban‘s presence 
in Hilmand and Nangarhar. It can be assumed that presence of Taliban influences level of drug-
trafficking in the region and failure of alternative development projects in both provinces.  
 
As for other sources I use in my project, there are different videos made by the donors and NGO‗s 
in Afghanistan. Most of these videos can be found on YouTube‗s website. The videos are connected 
to the development of agriculture and alternative development in various regions of Afghanistan.  
 
In general, the topic of alternative development in Afghanistan has been studied less than 20 years. 
Year after year, though, the topic is being studied more deeply and more authors are involved in 
research. 
 
2.2. Research design 
 
In order to analyze the problem and in relation to the empirical data I use, my work will be divided 
into the following chapters: 
 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I formulate general topic and research question with a focus on the key issues. Based 
on theory, literature review and empirical findings, I am formulating research question connected to 
the illicit economy of opium and alternative livelihoods in Afghanistan. 
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2. Methodology 
 In the first part of the chapter I discuss key sources that are necessary when conducting a research 
on anti-drug policy and alternative development. I give an overview of the sources which I find 
more relevant and important for my project. In the second part of the chapter I describe the Project 
Design.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
In the Chapter III, I make a detailed review of the key project literature and authors. It includes 
review of anti-drug policy studies. The chapter can be divided into three parts: 
a) Literature on anti-drug policy from 1960s; 
b) Key literature on the Alternative Development programmes; 
c) Review of the literature on counter-narcotics measures and Alternative Livelihoods programmes 
in Afghanistan. 
 
In the second part of the chapter I am analyzing ―political capital model of illicit economies‖ of V. 
Felbab-Brown approach aimed to answer research questions of the project. 
 
4. The role of Opium in Afghanistan and Political Economy of Opium. 
In this chapter I review the history of drugs in Afghanistan. Besides, I analyze the reasons why 
farmers cultivate opium, which techniques they use and how much opium they cultivate. 
 
5. International anti-drug policy. 
In the chapter V I give analysis of the International anti-drug policy starting from the 1980s. I am 
analyzing what are the main counter-narcotic measures that were implemented to countries with a 
high-level of drug cultivation and to Afghanistan in particularly. 
 
6. Counter-narcotics measures in Afghanistan with a special emphasis on alternative development. 
In the chapter VI, which regards to the main working question, I am giving an overview of different 
specific alternative development programmes in Afghanistan with a focus on various provinces and 
comparing the livelihoods implemented by various actors. Moreover, I am analyzing which 
programmes have been more effective in some provinces while nearly failed in other. 
 
7. Conclusion. 
The last chapter of my Project aims to conclude my work and give a brief overview of the reasons 
that influenced on success or failure of alternative development programmes. 
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The chapters II and III give a profound understanding of the sources on anti-drug policies and 
alternative development programmes. Further, I compare critics of various counter-narcotics 
measures, according to key authors. Chapter IV focuses on opium economy and the reasons why 
farmers cultivate opium in Afghanistan, which insurgent groups involved in drug trafficking. 
Moreover, it focuses on the effectiveness of alternative development strategies in regions where 
various projects were implemented to.  The core chapters of my project are the chapters III, V and 
VI. In these chapters I am trying to find an answer to the research question of my project. 
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III. Theoretical framework 
 
3.1. State of the Art 
 
Although there are a lot of literature and a lot of reports and articles on the history of anti-drug 
policy and its development and impacts on different societies, there are also many authors who are 
making research on the concrete counter-narcotics measures and their success and failure 
(McAllister 1992a). In particularly, many scholars evaluate eradication and interdiction measures 
implemented in different regions with a high level of drug cultivation. Moreover, the anti-drug 
policy of some countries such as the U.S. in certain countries was very much connected only to 
implementation of eradication measures. For example, the US anti-drug policy focus of early-mid 
1980s in Colombia was mostly on interdiction an eradication measures. George R. Taylor and 
Sewall H. Menzel give overview of them in the work ―Cocaine Quagmire: Implementing the US 
Anti-Drug Policy in the North-Andes Colombia" (2000a). 
 
In 1980-1990s, the main strategies of the anti-drug policy were coca crop eradication, interdiction 
of cocaine, and alternative development programs. ―Plan Colombia‖ strategy, implemented by 
Columbian government was aimed to combat drug trafficking and improve the state-building 
processes. DeShazo, Mendelson Forman, and McClean (2009) give a positive assessment of the 
―Plan Columbia‖ and note that it helped to improve security conditions in the country. According to 
them, the violence level and the role of illegal narcotics in Columbian economy have reduced. In 
contrast, such authors as Youngers, Rosin (2004a) and Walsch (2004) criticize the efforts of anti-
drug policies not only in some Latin American but also Asian regions with a high level of coca and 
opium cultivation. For example, Byrd and Ward note that eradication measures are not always 
effective: “…a key lesson is that eradication of illicit narcotics in the fields alone will not work and 
is likely to be counterproductive, resulting in perverse incentives for farmers to grow more drugs 
(e.g., in Colombia), displacement of production to more remote areas, and fueling of violence and 
insecurity (e.g., Peru, Bolivia, Colombia), which in several cases forced the eradication policy to be 
reversed and led to adverse political outcomes. Neither does the approach of making eradication a 
condition for development assistance work without alternative livelihoods already in place, 
premature eradication can alienate the affected population and damage the environment for rural 
development” (Byrd, Ward 2004a:13). 
 
In addition, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy (2005) also notes about the problems eradication measures 
caused. According to Chouvy, ―the forced reduction of opium production during 2003-2004 in 
Myanmar (down 54%) and in Laos (down 64%) could well have perverse effects such as shifting 
production to other areas. This was the case in 2002-2003 when a 50% drop in production in the 
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Kokang Area of Myanmar‗s Northern Shan State caused opium farming and production to shift to 
the northern end of the Myanmar‗s Wa special region. But eradication and interdiction have another 
major perverse effect: they drives prices up‖ (Chouvy 2005). 
 
Kathryn Ledebur in her research ―Bolivia: clear consequences, Drugs and Democracy in Latin 
America: the impact of the U.S. Policy‖ (2004) also mentions that eradication measures have not 
been always effective. Coletta A. Youngers and and Hielen Rosin have very strong opinion on 
eradication. They argue: ―In Bolivia rapid eradication of coca bush have produced violence‖ 
(Youngers et al., 2009b). If eradication and interdiction are being mostly criticized, the 
implementation of alternative development in most of the reports (such as ―Thai-German Highland 
Development project‖, Impact Assessment Study) highlights the success of alternative development 
in the area. Some authors argue about the success of alternative development because of cultural 
aspects of the region. For example, Leik Boonwaat (2004b) mentions Palavek Project (1989-1996) 
in Lao, which provided farmers with simple post-harvest technology. According to Boonwaat, 
―showing that strong clan leadership and community involvement can reduce the cultivation of 
opium poppy without forced eradication of punishment‖ (Boonwaat 2004b) Implementation of 
alternative development programmes as a part of anti-drug policy to the countries with the high-
level of drug consumption does not have very long history as well. Nevertheless, there have been 
many authors who published their articles and books on the topic. For example, Lupu (2004), 
Farthing, Kohl (2005) and Phan-Gruber (2010) are well-known experts publishing on the alternative 
development in Latin America. For example, Farthing and Kohl (2005a) analyze such programmes 
as Plan de Apoyo a la Estrategia de Desarrollo Alternativo en el Chapare (PRAEDAC). The 
programme aimed to decrease the level of production of illicit crops and build social infrastructure. 
There are also authors who describe the differences between the counter narcotic measures 
implemented by various actors. As Emily Phan-Gruber (2010a) notes, in the beginning, the U.S. 
programmes were more focused on eradication measures, while the European Union and United 
Nations projects concentrated on development from the very beginning. She also notes that in 1990-
s the programs have made some significant gains in terms of licit crop cultivation, increasing 
municipality capabilities, increased production and marketing capabilities, and creating new jobs. 
However, as I am describing more in details in the following chapters, some of the USAID 
alternative development projects in Colombia failed and coca cultivation remained in the country. 
The two core strategies ―More Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development‖ (MIDAS) and 
―Areas for Municipal Level Alternative Development‖ (ADAM) implemented by USAID in 
Columbia were criticized by some authors. As Felbab-Brown et al. note, the programs do not reach 
all the people in need and ―pervasive sense among Colombian actors charged with implementing 
alternative livelihoods policies that their programs reach less than 10 percent of families cultivating 
coca. This percentage becomes even smaller if one includes the numbers of families vulnerable to 
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coca cultivation because of the insecurity of the area where they live and their attendant difficulties 
in cultivating and selling legal crops‖ (Felbab-Brown et al 2009a).  
 
It should be noted that interdiction in some countries have also been a part of counter narcotic 
policy. If taking the example of Afghanistan, most of the authors are arguing that actually 
interdiction measures could be more successful rather than eradication. Many authors such as Johan 
Hari (2006) even note that eradication measures made Afghan people to turn against NATO forces. 
Ahmad Ihsan Sarwaryar, Nadeem Kohistani, and Zubair Babakarkhel (2006) believe that 
―Elimination of narcotics will take well over a decade, and crop eradication is a counterproductive 
way to start such a program‖ (Sarwaryar et al. 2006). As for interdiction, the opinions are more 
positive. W. Byrd (2008) believes that interdiction is more effective than eradication due to the 
following reasons: 
1. Interdiction is much more cost-effective from a technical perspective; 
2. Rather than criminalizing farmers this option can target the elements of the drug industry that 
constitute the major threat to Afghanistan‗s state-building, governance and development agenda; 
3. Interdiction is likely to increase the ―wedge between farm-gate and downstream prices, 
potentially even reducing farm-gate prices in the short run, thereby discouraging cultivation. In 
contrast, eradication tends to increase farm-gate prices; 
4. Interdiction, if effectively implemented in an even-handed manner, can enhance the 
government‗s credibility by going after criminal elements rather than farmers and wage laborers 
(Byrd 2008a). In general, there have been a lot of critics of counter narcotic measures in 
Afghanistan. After the 2001 intervention the level of opium cultivation started to increase, although 
international actors have implemented various alternative livelihoods to the country. John A. Glaze 
(2007a), in his ―Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing U.S. Counter-narcotics strategy‖, criticizes 
US counter-narcotics strategy. According to him, this strategy has been ineffective for 3 reasons: 
1) Afghanistan lacks a security environment to conduct successful counter-narcotics strategy; 
2) emphasis on eradication is not productive; 
3) the 5-pillar counter-narcotics strategy is not adequately prioritized. 
 
Byrd and Ward note, ―all the initiatives to reduce opium production failed‖. They also believe that: 
―Alternative livelihoods approaches are attractive, but as the primary instrument of a drug reduction 
strategy they suffer from major weaknesses in time scale, cost and effectiveness…moreover, opium 
would remain the crop of choice particularly for resource-rich farmers, and poorer farmers may 
continue to be bound to the opium economy by debt‖ (Byrd and Ward, 2004b:21). Pain in 
―Reconstructing Agriculture in Afghanistan‖ also notes ―international community got many things 
wrong at many levels following September 2001‖. He is also being critic about donors (Pain 
2007a). 
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In contrast to academic literature, authors of official reports on counter narcotic measures normally 
give more positive assessment of alternative development in the countries with a high-level of drug 
cultivation. However, the anti-drug policies in Afghanistan are being criticized more than counter 
narcotic measures in other regions. For example, according to UNODC‘s, ―Afghanistan Opium 
Rapid Assessment Survey (UNODC 2005b)‖:  ―Opium production in Thailand fell from 145 tons in 
the 1960s to fewer than 10 tons by 2000. Thailand, unlike other countries in either region affected 
by cultivation of illicit crops and thus a special case, incorporated Alternative Development into 
large scale development in the highlands beginning in the 1960s….Eradication by the Royal Thai 
Army and Border Patrol Police helped, but more than a dozen major donor-assisted development 
projects also began during the period‖. 
 
Overall, international anti-drug policies and especially eradication measures are being criticized by 
many authors. Mostly, scholars are arguing that eradication measures (or implementing only 
eradication measures cannot be very successful). Among the key authors who criticize eradication 
are Howard Rahtz, James Gray, Glenn Greenwald, Ed Rosenthal , Steve Kubby, Steve Fox, Paul 
Armentano and Mason Tvert , George R. Taylor, Sewall H. Menzel, Youngers and Walsch. The 
official reports of International Organizations mostly contain of the information on statistics, but 
sometimes they are giving positive evaluation of the implemented measures. 
 
It should be noted that many authors (Felbab-Brown, Glaze, Byrd and Ward, Pain) on alternative 
development, and in particularly on alternative development in Afghanistan are also being very 
critic about the efforts of international community in this field. 
 
3.2. “Political capital model of illicit economies” approach 
 
As I described in the chapter 3.1, there are many opinions and debates on effectiveness of anti-drug 
policies. While most of the authors criticize eradication, some of them are being positive about 
interdiction and alternative development. 
 
Although international intervention to Afghanistan started more than 13 years ago, the level of 
opium cultivation and production has not decreased, but reached the highest level. Trying to 
understand what measures did not work and why, many authors are criticizing anti-drug policies in 
Afghanistan. However, I believe that some alternative livelihoods have been quite effective and 
employed many people (saffron production in some provinces). Many other alternative 
development programmes failed and economy of the country still remains illicit. 
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In order to understand what kinds of impact opium illicit economy created on development of 
Afghan state since 2001 and  how alternative development programmes implemented to 
Afghanistan since 2001 influenced political capital of Afghan illicit economy it is essential to study 
more deeply key authors on anti-drug policies and relevant approaches. 
 
Vanda Felbab-Brown is an author of many articles and books on effectiveness of anti-drug policies 
in Afghanistan. She believes that drugs are seen as the ―greatest threat‖ to Afghanistan (Felbab-
Brown, 2005a:55). This thought has been prevailing in works of other scholars as well. Ole Waever, 
Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde in developing of the Theory of Securitization described how 
various Speech-acts have been used in order to frame opium as a threat in Afghanistan (Buzan 
1998).  
 
In most of her books and articles Felbab-Brown names eradication of opium in Afghanistan the 
most counterproductive measure. Moreover, it is not just ineffective, but also dangerous as drugs 
represent the most reliable source of income for the most of Afghan population.   Aerial eradication 
that have been actively implemented by the U.S. government lead to alliances between local 
farmers and Taliban who would ―come and save‖ fields from eradication shooting U.S. eradication 
planes. Moreover, eradication led to several riots of farmers. In 2012 eradication team was attacked 
117 times (UNODC and Ministry of Counter Narcotics, 2012a)  
  
Felbab-Brown stresses that illicit economy and non-effectiveness of anti-drug policies along with 
insecurity and underdeveloped infrastructure cause support of belligerents by local farmers. Author 
calls it ―political capital: ―…belligerents derive much more than just large financial profits from 
their sponsorship of illicit economies. They also obtain freedom of action and, crucially, legitimacy 
and support from the local population—what I call ―political capital” (Felbab-Brown, 2009b:5). 
Vanda Felbab-Brown develops her approach ―Political capital model of illicit economies‖ in her 
book ―Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs‖. She believes that there is a strong 
relationship between illicit economy activity and military conflict. Although, the government of 
Afghanistan in cooperation with international actors coordinate all the counter-narcotics measures 
in the country, enormous part of the country‘s economy is controlled by insurgent groups, primarily 
Taliban. As a result, Taliban not only controls the fields, but also forces farmers to cooperate with 
them and to declare about any anti-drug activities held by government. As Felbab-Brown notes, 
even though villagers and farmers do not show ―pro-Taliban‖ feelings openly, many of them silently 
support Taliban. Thus, author believes that eradication resulting in rise of the political capital of 
belligerents. 
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Political Capital Model explains how insurgent groups involved in illicit economy activities benefit 
from them, as they affect on the strength of these groups. The Political Capital Model helps to 
understand interactions between belligerent groups, local population, drug traffickers and the 
government in conditions of illicit economies. 
 
In contrast with other approaches, Felbab-Brown argues that involvement of belligerent group in the 
illicit economies affects both its military capability and political capital. Military capability consists 
of: a) physical resources; b) freedom of action. Political capital consists of: a) perceived legitimacy 
(people‘s belief in legitimacy of belligerents‘ actions); b) popular support (people‘s volunteer 
support of belligerents). 
 
Mediation between strength of belligerent group and its involvement in the illicit economy is 
connected to four conditions: 
1) the state of the overall economy; 
2) the character of the illicit economy; 
3) the presence or absence of thuggish traffickers; 
4) the government response to the illicit economy. 
 
By the definition of ―belligerents‖ author mean any non-government group such as insurgents, 
terrorists, warlords. According to the approach, involvement of belligerents in illicit economy can 
be either positive, negative or there can be no involvement. Positive involvement implies that illicit 
economy is sponsored by belligerents. Negative involvement implies that belligerents try to find 
ways to destroy the illicit economy. Not involvement means that belligerents do not protect, nor 
destroy the illicit economy (Felbab-Brown, 2009c:6:14). 
 
After eradication farmers seek for a support of local belligerents because poppy is crop of high 
importance for Afghan farmers. Opium is not just a livelihood for farmers, but is also used for 
majority of microcredit. Creditors give money for peasants in advance and in return peasants 
obliged to grow opium (Mansfield, 2004a). Knowing that opium is used as a part of traditional 
―Hawala‖ banking system, it means that poppy seeds make enormous part of Afghan‘s illicit 
economy. Passas views ―Hawala‖ widely used in Afghanistan as a method of laundering criminal 
finances (Passas, 2013). Afghanistan‘s illicit drug market is the equivalent of 10% of its Gross 
Domestic Product (UNODC 2013b). 
 
In contrast to eradication, AD programmes, however, could be more effective if they do not offer to 
peasants only crop substitution. Developing approach author quotes Mansfield, stating that ―other 
structural economic conditions, such as the state of infrastructure, market instability, and 
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availability of credit, play crucial roles‖ (Mansfield, 2004). In case of stable security situation in the 
country the key components for alternative livelihoods implementation to succeed in Afghanistan 
are the following:  
1) building infrastructure 
2) distribution of new technologies 
3) marketing assistance 
4) developing local microcredit (Felbab-Brown, 2005b). 
 
Opium makes quite a big part of Afghan economy. When it comes to alternative development, 
political capital strengthens positions of Taliban (Felbab-Brown, 2009d) because of its role of a 
―farmers‘ basic livelihood protector‖. Though, international community tries to reach all the parts of 
the country and to provide with alternative livelihoods more people, the programs do not reach 
majority of countries‘ population. The main reason is luck of security measures. In this case, 
Felbab-Brown notes that…‖ they (eradication or alternative livelihoods programmes) will not be 
effective in reducing the illicit economy unless firm security throughout the entire territory has been 
established first (Felbab-Brown, 2013a:204). 
 
 
On the basis of ―political capital model of illicit economy‖ approach, debates of scholars on 
effectiveness approach in the following chapters I am focusing on anti-drug policies in Afghanistan 
and analyze which progarmmes have been most effective and why. Although, alternative 
development programmes seem to be not effective unless Afghanistan is underdeveloped insecure 
state, the have been some programmes that showed positive effect in some provinces. In addition, 
the programmes like licensing of opium might bring some changes to the political capital of current 
illicit economy of Afghanistan.  
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IV. The Role of Opium in Afghanistan and Political economy of Opium 
 
 
Afghanistan is a country in South East Asia and does not have very rich natural sources. In 2012, 
Afghanistan was ranked number 175 out of 187 countries (country ranking according to Human 
Development Index) (Afghanistan Human Development Report, 2013). Country is divided into 34 
provinces with the capital in Kabul.  
 
 
 
Map 1. Map of Afghanistan (Source: afghandesk.com). 
 
Infrastructure of the country is in bad conditions: there is lack of proper roads and electricity. 
Initially, Afghanistan is agricultural state. Vast majority of Afghan people are dependent on 
agriculture. In Afghanistan, one can see across the landscape-the patches and ribbons of vivid green 
of young beans, rice and wheat, opium fields, the orchards of almonds, apricots and apples. 
 
Planners of Afghan agriculture have mapped the country according to four frameworks: agro 
political, geo-ecological, river basin and watershed (Pain 2007b). Afghanistan is landscape mostly 
comprising valleys in the mountains and irrigated strips of land around rivers and canals in the 
plains (Pain 2007c). The crop that has played the most significant role for Afghan‗s economy is 
Opium. The reason why poppy is so attractive for an Afghan farmers is because the income 
received after cultivation of opium cannot be compared to the income received from cultivation 
other crops. 
Opium poppy is a crop easy to grow. It is planted between September and December and blooms 
normally in 3 months. Afterwards, the flower‗s petals fall away, leaving the plant‗s seed capsule 
containing an opaque (opium). Harvested between April and July, the plump seed capsules are then 
lanced, allowing the opium sap to ooze out for collection after it has dried into a black tar-like 
substance (Glaze 2007). The opium sap is then refined into opiate-based products. For Afghan 
farmers it is 17 times more profitable growing opium rather than other crops: they can receive US$ 
4,622 per hectare comparing to US$ 266 per hectare for wheat. The crop is the easiest and the most 
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profitable to grow, it is also drought resistant and easy to transport. The main opium producing 
areas in Afghanistan are located in the dry land areas, so farmers do not have many other crop 
opportunities, but opium. The process of harvesting opium includes lancing and later gathering the 
opium gum. Before the internal juices are exhausted, each capsule is slit six or seven times (Griffith 
1993). When the gum has been collected, the seeds remaining in each capsule are processed by 
farmers for oil. In 1930s Afghanistan was exporting opium legally, but in early 1940s cultivation 
was banned. In 1960s and 1970s cultivation continued on a low level until it has risen significantly 
after 2001 (Pain 2012a). Today, the economy of the country with the highest-level of poppy 
cultivation in the world is very much dependent on opium. According to UNODC Afghanistan 
Opium Survey 2013, the total area under opium poppy cultivation in 2013 was 209,000 hectares. 
The provinces with the highest level of poppy cultivation are Hilmand, Kandahar, Nangarhar, 
Badakhshan, Farah. According to the Survey, in 2013 cultivation increased by 34% in Hilmand 
province, Afghanistan‗s principal poppy-cultivating province comparing to previous years since 
2005. Moreover, cultivation increased in Nangarhar and Nimroz (UNODC 2013c). 
 
Many scholars argue that opium plays an important role in Afghanistan‗s informal economy (Ward, 
Byrd, 2004). As described in the previous chapters, Afghanistan is one of the Golden Crescent 
countries and had been the world‗s leader in opium trafficking for many years. After the Cold War, 
Afghanistan along with Burma became world‗s main opium-producing countries. 
 
According to the Asian Development Bank Country Partnership Strategy for Afghanistan, there are 
many advantages to cultivating poppy in the current economic and political climate of Afghanistan. 
The ADB report elaborates that ―Opium poppy can be planted almost anywhere in the country, 
although it grows best in free draining sandy loam soils. It is so well suited to Afghanistan‗s agro-
climatic conditions that it produces higher than the global average yields of raw opium and 
morphine and maximizes to scarce irrigation water. This latter attribute and its marketability have 
proven crucial to farmers with small land holdings and large families, particularly in remote areas 
where opium poppy cultivation is becoming increasingly concentrated‖ (Asian Development Bank 
Country Partnership Strategy for Afghanistan 2012). 
 
The level of opium cultivation has not always been on the same level over the years, though. 
Baghlan, Faryab, Kapisa and Ghor were poppy-free provinces in 2010. Helmand has shown 
decreasing poppy cultivation trends over the period between 2007-2010, declining from 103,590 
hectares in 2008 to 65,045 hectares in 2010 (UN News Centre 2011).  
 
According to ―Afghanistan Opium Survey‖ (UNODC, 2013d), the top-reasons why farmers (n=396 
farmers in 2013) cultivated poppy were the following: 
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1. High sale price of opium (72%); 
2. High income from little land (3%); 
3. To improve living condition (8%); 
4. Poverty (provision of basic food and shelter) (6%); 
5. To cope up with domestic expenditures (2%); 
6. Lack of support from Government/other sources (2%). 
 
High income received after purchasing the product is one of the main features of illicit economies, 
as I described in the Chapter III. Moreover, among reasons of cultivation are lack of support from 
Government and poverty, which in turn is a result of insecurity within the country. Thus, official 
statistics of the UNODC proves theoretical approach of Felbab-Brown. 
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V. International anti-drug policy 
 
5.1. Anti-drug policies after 1980s 
 
International anti-drug policies have rapidly developed in 1980s. One of the main actors involved in 
this policy was the United Nations of America. The regions with a high level of drug cultivation 
have always been in the neighboring to the U.S. countries, such as Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. 
The US anti-drug policy focus of early-mid 1980s in Colombia was mostly on interdiction an 
eradication measures. In order to support the US anti-drug policy, Colombian government entered 
into a bi-lateral extradition treaty with the US in 1979 (Taylor, Menzel 2000b). Although, the fight 
against the consumption, production and trafficking of illicit drugs has become global, the problem 
is still topical. Moreover, the level of consumption and cultivation of some types of illicit drugs is 
only growing. 
 
The level of consumption in 1980s was extremely high as well, although, in 2000s it started to 
decline in some regions, comparing to the previous decade. At the same time, after 2001 thanks to 
the processes of globalization, the routes of trafficking became wider. Besides, the problems of drug 
consumption and drug trafficking are very much connected to such factors as corruption, terrorism 
and other crimes.  
 
5.2.Alternative Development policies 
 
Measures of international anti-drug policy included the development of alternative development 
programmes. The history of development of alternative livelihood programs is not very old; it has 
started in the second half of the twentieth century. Geographically, the areas where the alternative 
development programs were implementing include Andean region in South America (Bolivia, 
Colombia and Peru) and Southeast Asia, where the level of drug production and cultivation is very 
high. As for Latin America, the anti-drug assistance programs have started there in the mid-1970s 
and the main actor who invested in these programs was the U.S. government. 
 
The main crops cultivated in Latin America are coca bush, and opium poppy. The core regions that 
produce and cultivate coca bush are mostly Colombia, Peru and Bolivia and the main producer of 
opium is Mexico. According to the NDIC data, the drug trafficking organizations from Mexico 
represent the ―greatest organized crime threat to the United States‖ (NDIC 2009). The main 
organizations are Arellano Felix Organization (Tijuana), Beltran Leyva Organization, Los Zetas, 
Sinaloa (La Federaciуn), Carillo Fuentes Organization (Juбrez), Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. 
Obviously, the drug production and trafficking causes a high level of crime rates. The U.S., who is 
the closest neighbour of Latin American countries, has started combating the drug production and 
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trafficking thirty years ago. In the mid-1970s U.S. Government started so-called ―War on drugs‖. 
According to the statistics from the U.S. State Department and ONDCP, the land under coca 
cultivation between the years 1987-2008 was following: ―the average annual estimate was 200,040 
hectares, ranging from a low of 176,000 hectares (in 1987) to a high of 232,500 hectares (in 2007). 
The 2008 estimate of 192,000 hectares was almost identical to the estimate for the year 2000 
(190,000 hectares)‖ (U.S. State Department 2010). 
 
In 1980-1990s, the main strategies of the anti-drug policies were coca crop eradication, interdiction 
of cocaine, and alternative development programs. For example, ―Plan Colombia‖ strategy, 
implemented by Columbian government was aimed to combat drug trafficking and terrorism and 
build democratic state. The U.S. Government supported «Plan Columbia». Peter DeShazo et al. (De 
Shazo 2009) note that the ―Plan Columbia‖ improved security conditions in Columbia. For 
example, the violence level and the role of illegal narcotics in Columbian economy have reduced. 
The alternative development in the countries of Latin America is connected to the processes drugs 
securitization by the U.S. Government. The U.S.-Mexican programmes aimed to interdict cocaine, 
combat trafficking of marijuana and opium and to strength the rule of law in Mexico started their 
development after the Binational Drug Control Strategy was signed in a year 1998. Although, the 
eradication strategy seems to be the best solution to the drug cultivation, it has faced a lot of critics. 
Eradication measures were used in order to reduce illicit crop cultivation level. However, these 
measures were not very successful. For example, in 1999, the U.S. Government eradicated fields 
with coca in 12 Columbian departments, and in 2008, coca cultivation was evident in 24 
departments. In 2005 World Bank (2005) made some critics concerning this issue: ―A key lesson is 
that eradication alone will not work and is likely to be counterproductive, resulting in perverse 
incentives for farmers to grow more drugs (for example, in Colombia), and displacement of 
production to more remote areas, and fuelling violence and insecurity (Peru, Bolivia and 
Colombia)‖ (The World Bank, Afghanistan 2005a). 
 
The reason why eradication measures do not work is because the vast majority of the farmers who 
cultivate illegal crops are poor and the only income they have is connected to the drug trade. 
Destruction of the fields with illegal crops leads to corruption and extreme instability. According to 
the World Bank, alternative livelihoods ―are already in place, premature eradication can alienate the 
affected population and damage the environment for rural development‖, (The World Bank, 
Afghanistan 2005b). Not only World Bank, but also the European Union noticed that “unless 
alternative livelihoods are available, [forced eradication] could undermine sustainable solutions and 
thus fail in achieving its goals‖ (EU Presidency Paper 2008). 
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The idea of promoting alternative development started in 1970s, with the development of 
international anti-drug policy. In the 1970s and 1980s the U.S. government slowly started to 
implement the idea, however in practice the process was extremely difficult. Year by year more and 
more actors got involved in the promoting of alternative livelihood programs among the population 
of poorest countries. The main actors involved in the development of alternative livelihood 
programs are European Commission (EC), UNODC, the Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO), and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.  Thus, the 
programs of alternative development in Latin American countries were implemented not only by 
U.S. Government, but also by the United Nations and the European Union.  
 
Taking example of Bolivia, we can see which programs of alternative development and by what 
actors were implementing in Latin America. In current chapter I will take the examples of 
development of alternative livelihood programs in Bolivia and Columbia. In general, Latin 
American families received significant alternative development assistance from the U.S. 
Government. In 1997, the U.S. aided 2554 families while in 2004 the number increased up to 25290 
families (U.S. General Accounting Office 2005a). However, Farthing and Kohl (2005b) note that 
due to wide range of figures produced by USAID and Bolivian Government it is impossible to 
know the exact number of families assisted. However, the ―Jatun Sacha‗s‖ programme helped 64 
communities to develop Forest Management Plans. As for other successful alternative development 
programs, Farthing and Kohl mentioned the program that was successful in raising the capacity of 
municipalities. For example, PRAEDAC‗s training of municipalities helped them to improve their 
public administrative capacity. Between 1983-1992, the U.S. government first implemented the 
Chapare Regional Development Project (CRDP) and spent around US$ 22.5 million in total. First 
projects focused on building country‗s infrastructure, and then on implementing alternative to coca 
crops. Between 1991 and 1997 the Cochabamba Regional Development Project was implemented. 
The aim of the Program was to increase employment opportunities in the country. According to the 
United States General Accounting Office, the Governments of Bolivia and the U.S.A. cooperated at 
the National Directorate for Agricultural Reconversion Cash Compensation Program. The rule of 
the programme was to make agreements with the farmers not to grow coca, but instead they were 
giving cash money. Another huge Project of the U.S. was the Counternarcotics Consolidation of 
Alternative Development Efforts Project (CONCADE) between 1998 and 2005. CONCADE 
included a lot of projects, including implementation of alternative crop, support of agricultural 
initiatives (U.S. General Accounting Office 2005b). 
 
The success of CONCADE depended on the type of crops cultivated. Those who were growing 
bananas and pineapples wanted to increase the production of these foodstuffs. Farmers were 
satisfied with the prices. At the same time, farmers who were growing palm hearts and citrus 
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producers were dissatisfied because they didn‗t receive any incomes (Phan-Gruber 2010b). In 
general, there are a great amount of families who received the alternative development assistance 
from the U.S. Government. In 1997 the U.S. aided 2.554 families while in 2004 the number 
increased to 25.290 families (U.S. General Accounting Office 2005c). However, Farthing and Kohl 
note that due to wide range of figures produced by USAID and Bolivian Government it is 
impossible to know the exact number. 
 
When taking examples of development of alternative livelihoods, it is important to take an example 
of another country of the Andean region-Colombia. Colombia is a country that has a long history of 
instability and underdevelopment in some of its areas. Rural parts of the country still have high 
level of examples of violence. During many years Colombia received no aid to develop alternative 
development until the ―Plan Columbia‖ started in the 1990s. The assistance of the USAID 
―represents the largest amount of money dedicated to rural development in Colombia‖ (Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in America 2009). The projects basically failed and coca cultivation still remained 
in the country. Later, USAID implemented two core alternative development strategies: “More 
Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development‖ (MIDAS) and ―Areas for Municipal Level 
Alternative Development‖ (ADAM). As Felbab-Brown et al (2009b) note, the programs reached 
only small percentage of people in need.  
 
In general, some scholars criticized the USAID Projects. For example, Quimbayo Ruiz (2008) notes 
that these projects generating little employment, at low wages. Moreover, Tenthoff also notices that 
some leading to infrastructure development USAID-projects could have negative impacts on 
environment (Tenthoff 2008). As I mentioned earlier, the International anti-drug policy is young and 
many counter narcotic measures that are being implemented are still need to be improved. Probably 
it will take another 50 years until International actors will find the best way to fight against this 
problem. People who cultivate illicit crops are initially poor and the main reason for cultivation 
illicit crop is simply because farmers need to survive. The first steps that most of the actors involved 
in anti-drug policies implement are eradication and interdiction measures, which usually are not 
very effective.  
However, since the beginning of implementation of alternative development programmes there was 
some decrease in the cultivation level in some regions. According to theoretical approaches, any 
anti-drug measures will be successful until country is secure and infrastructure is developed. The 
case of Afghanistan is one of the examples. Afghanistan is the country with the highest level of 
opium cultivation on the Planet. International intervention to Afghanistan started in 2001, but not 
much improvement has been achieved so far. The most effective counter narcotic measures 
implemented to Afghanistan was alternative development. 
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VI. Counter narcotic measures in Afghanistan with a special emphasis on Alternative 
Development 
 
Afghanistan is the country with very rich and long history. However, it has been notorious for 
political instability and internal conflicts. Afghanistan was ruled by Great Britain and became 
independent only in 1919, after the end of the Third Anglo-Afghan War and after the Treaty of 
Rawalpindi was signed (Katzman 2013). After independence, the country has been ruled by ten 
governments. In the 20th century it was involved in several conflicts and after 2001 International 
Community began intervention in Afghan state. 
 
After the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States on the 11th of September 2001, the 
Government of the U.S., supported by international coalition entered Afghanistan in order to 
remove ruling Taliban regime. After these attacks, the government of the U.S.A. and allies started 
so called ―War on terror‖. For reconstructing Afghan state and building a new society the measures 
such as re-construction of state institutions and infrastructure has been implemented. Moreover, as a 
part of re-construction, provision of alternative development programmes has been provided. In 
2004 after Hamid Karzai became the President of the Afghan state and the international community 
started actively helping Afghanistan. Obviously, counter-narcotic measures were among priorities, 
due to linkage between building a democratic state, security and licit opium-free economy. Counter-
narcotics strategy was also based on improving living conditions for farmers (Misra 2004). 
Following the Bonn Agreement 2001, the modern intervention in Afghanistan started. Since 2001, a 
significant number of international actors got involved in state building processes in Afghanistan. 
As Tanner (2002) notes, the International Community got involved to Afghanistan under Resolution 
1386 of the United Nations Security Council (Tanner 2002). It is important to notice that the U.S. 
and its allies, the Afghan Government and UNODC considered that ―fighting drug trafficking equal 
fighting terrorism‖ (Chouvy 2006). 
 
Before the invasion to Afghanistan in 2001, the country‗s economic sector was in extremely poor 
condition. Among the other factors, international intervention continued to send humanitarian aid, 
which also played an important role in the development of the country. The overall figure of $15.3 
billion aid was received by Afghan State only in 2012, according to the Ministry of Finance, 
Afghanistan (Ministry of Finance, Afghanistan 2012). The most of the aid Afghanistan began to 
receive after 2004, when Hamid Karzai became the president. After intervention started there have 
been a lot of actors involved in the rebuilding of Afghan state, among them 41 International Red 
Cross Movement, 120 NGOs and 40 United Nations agencies (Goodhand 2002). International 
actors‘ presence in Afghanistan can be explained by the will of International society to help Afghan 
Government to build democratic state and reduce the level of opium cultivation in the country. As I 
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mention in previous chapters of my research, opium poppy have also been seen as a threat to many 
societies all across the world. 
 
According to Felbab-Brown‘s ―Political capital model of illicit economies‖ approach, opium is an 
example of illegal drugs ―the production or provision of which is either completely prohibited by 
governments or international regimes (or both) or partially proscribed…‖ (Felbab-Brown 2009d:2). 
Thus, opium which is a part of illegal drug economy contributes towards Afghan illicit economy. 
One of the aims of international actors involved in the humanitarian actions in Afghanistan was to 
fight against cultivation, production and trafficking of opium, influencing on country‘s economy. 
 
The aid received from the Government of the United States of America was the biggest. 
Organizations from the U.S.A. were leading in various fields, including alternative development. 
The overall sum of money the Government of the U.S.A. implemented to Afghanistan is US$ 
89,416.42 on different purposes during the years 2002-2012 (Joint Strategic oversight plan 
Afghanistan reconstruction 2013). Afghanistan today is the world‗s number one producer of opiates. 
Country became the leading in the 1990‗s, during the rule of Mujahedins (freedom fighters) (Todd 
et al. 2005) In 2000s, however, with the ban on the opium cultivation, announced by Taliban, the 
level of opium production declined significantly. It seemed to be a good sign, but it can be argued 
that the leaders of Taliban reduced the level of opium cultivation in order to re-sell it at higher price. 
The expected demand on a banned product was high on an illegal market (Peters 2009). With a 
slight decline in 2005, the level of cultivation is increasing year by year. According to the data of 
the United Nations office on Drugs and Crimes, and its ―World Drug Report 2013‖, 74% of today‗s 
global illicit opium is of Afghan origin. Moreover, comparing to the previous years, the level of 
opium cultivation in Afghanistan has only increased. According to the  statistics of the UNODC, it 
reached 209,000 and a rise of 36% in 2013. The sum of illegal opiates trades from Afghanistan was 
US$ 65bn with 16.5 million users (worldwide) (UNODC 2013e). 
 
The main counter narcotic strategies that have been implemented in Afghanistan in order to reduce 
the level of opium cultivation are eradication, interdiction and alternative livelihoods. Several 
international actors (U.S. Government, British Government) in cooperation with the Government of 
Afghanistan have undertaken several strategies to eradicate opium from the fields. For example, 
Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) under the Ministry of Interior was actively eradicating poppy in the 
leading poppy growing provinces such as Helmand, Badakhshan, Hilmand, Kandahar and 
Nangahar. However, these measures caused negative responses from the side of farmers, who 
protested against eradication. As Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. State Department Senior 
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at that moment (2009) noted, the ―U.S. efforts to 
eradicate opium poppy crops in Afghanistan had been wasteful and ineffective‖ (BBC 2009). The 
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main elements of the US counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan are: Alternative livelihood 
development; public information campaigns; judicial reform; interdiction; eradication became main 
elements of counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan. As Blanchard (2009) notes, under the 
presidency of Obama, the U.S.A. have switched its focus from eradication to alternative 
development measures, since they seem to be more effective. 
 
As I described in Chapter III, eradication measures in Afghanistan were criticized by many scholars. 
Even after these measures were implemented, people continued cultivating opium. As Mr. Bacha, 
an average farmer from Nangarhar in the eastern part of Afghanistan has said: ―People are poor, 
families are big. Wheat is no good. The only thing that is good is poppies: they are gold‖ (Gannon 
2013). The will of this particular farmer to cultivate opium has connection to an income he receives 
after selling poppy. As Felbab-Brown argues, main features of illicit markets include high profits 
(Felbab-Brown 2009e). As opium is an illicit drug, its price on such markets is very high. Hence, 
farmers and other people involved in cultivation, production and trafficking of opium are likely to 
continue illicit activities until solutions to find alternative sources of sufficient incomes are found. 
 
Alternative development programmes are part of the counternarcotic strategies that could help 
farmers to switch from cultivation of illicit crop to licit activities.  At its 20th special session, in its 
Resolution S-20/4 E, The General Assembly defined Alternative Development as ‖a process to 
prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances through specifically designed rural development measures in the context of sustained 
national economic growth and sustainable development efforts in countries taking action against 
drugs, recognizing the particular sociocultural characteristics of the target communities and 
groups, within the framework of a comprehensive and permanent solution to the problem of illicit 
drugs” (UNODC 2005c). 
 
A number of international actors are working on the ground in Afghanistan, with the Afghan 
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, to introduce the option of alternative livelihoods 
in areas from which opium has been eradicated. The list includes the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), the European Union (EU), the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ ), Nordic Development, Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Swiss Agency or Development (SDC), GTZ , DFID 
(United Kingdom Department for International Development). Their aim is to help Afghan 
population to start licit crops or do the activities which are not connected to poppy cultivation. The 
biggest donor in Afghanistan is the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
which actively started alternative development in the country. In March 2008, USAID awarded a 
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two-year contract of US$ 55 million to Associates in Rural Development, Inc. for the Alternative 
Development Program Expansion, South West. USAID has conducted several alternative 
development programmes for different regions (USAID 2010c) 
 
The EU has also helped to increase agriculture and rural development and improved the health 
sector. During the period between 2002 and 2010, the EU contribution to Afghanistan was 8 billion 
euro, which included 15 million euro to the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund and 20.5 million euro to 
the GTZ Project for Alternative Livelihoods. The EU funds programmes of the improved wheat 
seed. The EU has worked with FAO, UNODC and the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation 
and Livestock in order to expand the production and utilization of certified seed across the country 
(UK Government 2011). 
 
This scheme has been implemented in 25 Afghan provinces and in the beginning local farmers have 
been very satisfied with it. Obviously, alternative development programmes are being implementing 
to the poorest regions where people do not have any other opportunity to gain money rather than 
cultivate illicit crops. According to farmer Said Anwar (USAID 2010a), the improved seed can 
produce a double harvest within a short period of time. However, trainings are not a very effective 
way to solve the problem and do not bring immediate effect. They will probably take tens of years 
to convince farmers that growing crops other than opium is a better and healthier option. Another 
problem is that farmers would never be paid as much for selling wheat as they are paid for opium. It 
is therefore doubtful whether farmers would voluntarily shift from opium cultivation to growing 
wheat, in accordance with the Felbab-Brown‘s ―political capital model of illicit economies‖ 
approach. 
 
However, not only international actors are involved in the implementation of alternative 
development. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) guided by the National 
Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) and in cooperation with UNODC, NGO‗s and other external actors 
aim to help to secure decrease in production, cultivation and trafficking of the illicit drugs. 
 
Felbab-Brown notes that in some cases strategies of fighting against opium which are being 
implemented by Government to suppress illicit economy are aimed not only to reduce criminal 
activity but also defeat belligerent groups (Felbab-Brown 2009f). For example, Taliban which is 
actively involved in illicit activities is seen as threat by the Government of Afghanistan. By 
implementation of various counter-narcotics measures and fight illicit economy, Afghan 
Government decreases military capability of Taliban. 
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According to the main objectives of implementing AL programmes by GIRoA (Ministry of Counter 
narcotics of Afghanistan 2012b) are following: 
 
1. To assist farmers, labourers and rural communities affected by GIRoA‗s counter narcotics 
campaigns (Public Awareness, Law Enforcement, Eradication) with a package of comprehensive, 
locally-adapted and practical interventions which could alleviate poverty, food insecurity and have a 
lasting impact on livelihoods; 
2. To assist farmers, labourers and rural communities who have consciously decided not to engage 
in the production of narcotics, through direct cultivation or through supply of labour, with a package 
of comprehensive, practical and sustainable interventions; 
3. To maintain the ―poppy-free‖ status (i.e., prevent the resurgence of poppy cultivation) in 
communities which have consciously opted not to engage in, or have strived to abandon, illicit 
cultivation and production of narcotics; 
4. To keep the pace of further reductions in cultivation of opium poppies and production of 
narcotics through effecting lasting change on livelihoods of currently subsistence households; 
5. To prevent the spread of cultivation to areas hitherto unaffected by narcotics by embedding 
counter-narcotics measures, realizing the mobility of the narco-entrepreneurs who are ready to 
exploit vulnerabilities; 
6. To achieve a steady reduction (25 % reduction after 6-years, or 5500 ha/year) of opium poppy 
cultivation, through alleviation of poverty and food insecurity, coupled with significant 
improvements in security, good governance and overall economic development, after the start of 
implementation of the Policy. 
 
As can be seen, a lot of effort has been made from the side of different actors in order to find an 
effective alternative to poppy. However, there are not so many programmes that have been effective. 
USAID/Afghanistan‗Alternative Development Program expansion, South West was one of the key 
programmes of the USAID. By 2009, the programme implemented 45 projects and has trained 
nearly 11,000 farmers. Moreover, the programme provided contracts to people in order to help 
people to sale their products (i.e. paprika) in such provinces as Farah, Helmand, Nimroz and 
Uruzgan (USAID 2010b). According to statistics, though, level of opium cultivation in these 
provinces has not reduced. 
 
According to USAID, Alternative Livelihoods efforts must be: 
1. Carefully sequenced with the other pillar activities; 
2. Have Afghan ownership; 
3. Focus on good governance; 
4. Extend state presence into rural areas; 
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5. Support economic growth. 
 
There were also the projects funded by the Government of the United Kingdom. Department for 
International Development of the United Kingdom (UKAID) in cooperation with Center for 
Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) introduced mint as an alternative crop to Afghan 
families in Helmand, Kabul, Kunduz and Nangarhar. Farmers were provided with the new 
equipment to produce mint water and mint oil. Although the RALF (Research into Alternative 
Livelihoods) pilot project ended in June 2008, the training centres for mint products have been 
established in various regions of the country. In general, UK Government has committed US$ 900 
million during 2002-2008. The main objective of the British programmes is connected to the 
creation of right-environment for development of the licit economy through building democratic 
state and promoting alternative livelihoods. The AL Programmes of DFID are broad, in particular 
they include: alternative crops, access to agricultural inputs and so on (UKAID 2010). 
 
One of the biggest actors involved in the alternative development policies in Afghanistan is United 
Nations office on Drugs and Crime. In cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan and 
International Community it aims to reduce the level of poppy cultivation in the country. On the 
Commission on Narcotic drugs that take place annually in Vienna representatives of Afghanistan 
raise the questions connected to the poppy cultivation. In its Concept Note on Alternative 
Livelihoods in Afghanistan, UNODC announced three elements that guide UNODC‗s alternative 
livelihoods strategy. 
Those elements are: 
1. Close analysis and monitoring of the opium economy‗s effects at the local level; 
2. Consolidating opium-free gains and securing the buffer zones; 
3. Balancing the distribution of development assistance (UNODC 2012). 
 
 
As mentioned, European actors are also playing important role in the processes of implementing 
Alternative livelihoods in Afghanistan. For example, Nordic Countries (Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Finland and Iceland) cooperate with the Afghan Government in the following fields: 
helping in building good governance, improvement of education, human rights, administrative 
reform, justice sector and fight against drugs (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
2009). No doubts, the projects of the DACAAR (Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees) 
were among the most successful ones. 
 
For example, DACAAR helped farmers to cultivate saffron. Cultivating this flower can bring 
farmers income which is 3 or 4 times higher than income received from cultivating wheat or corn. 
Moreover, the process of growing flowers is very easy. The project funded by DFID (UK‘s 
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Department for International Development) has been implemented by DACAAR‘s Rural 
Development Programme to Herat province in 2005. The programme has been very successful due 
to various reasons. Table below illustrates the advantages of the programme (DACAAR 2008). 
Overall, according to statistics, this programme is at the moment is the most successful alternative 
development strategy, as it lead to significant decrease of opium cultivation in Heart province since 
2005.  
 
Table 1. 
 
Low water  
requirement 
   1 or 2 irrigations usually suffice in Afghanistan 
Labour intensive     250 person-days per year 
Simple machinery All activities are possible by hand 
Easy transportation Compared to other crop products, saffron is not bulky 
Income is higher 
than for other crops 
At least 5,000 USD per ha annually 
International market The demand increases year by year 
Short growing 
season 
One month labour input required per year 
Suitable water 
requirement time 
During saffron growing season other crops do not need water 
7 years production  Land preparation and cultivation labour requirements only in the first 
year 
Low risk Drought resistance, no specific saffron diseases 
Gender   80% of activities can be carried out by women 
Good storage 
abilities  
Up to 2 years after drying 
High productivity Afghanistan's soil and climate are very suitable 
 
Source: Saffron Manual for Afghanistan: Planting, Maintenance, Harvesting and Processing, DACAAR Rural 
Development Program, 2008. 
 
 
According to the table one, the programme has a lot of advantages. First of all, it can help to employ 
women, while majority of AL programmes employ mostly men. Moreover, the flower is easy to 
grow and it is drought resistant. The activity does not require complicated tools, as all the work can 
be carried by hands. In addition, saffron is very popular out of Afghanistan, there are many people 
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who is interested in Afghan saffron production (it can be seen by visitors of the Afghan Saffron 
official web-page: afghansaffron.com). I believe that today the saffron production is one of the few 
effective Alternative livelihoods Programmes in Afghanistan. International actors should pay more 
attention to this business and spread Afghan Saffron industry within the country.  Growing not only 
saffron, but also other flowers in general seemed to be a good opportunity to fight poppy cultivation 
in Afghanistan. However, taking into consideration security conditions in modern Afghanistan, 
saffron implementation programme is under certain risks. Although some people might be 
interested in improvement and spread of the mentioned programme, some belligerent groups might 
not let it to develop. According to Felbab-Brown‘s approach, prosperity of saffron industry could 
lead to further decrease of illicit activities, which in turn may result in Taliban‘s loose of military 
capability and political capital as this insurgent group will not have income sufficient enough to 
support their activities and thus will ―fight‖ for markets. Although saffron industry is one of the 
most promising projects of alternative development in Afghanistan, conditions of insecurity may 
somehow affect it. 
European Union, who is also one of the key actors in the Afghan counter-narcotic field, has 
implemented the programmes that aim to help farmers to grow roses. One of the GTZ Project‘s 
implemented to Afghanistan was aimed to help farmers to cultivate flowers in order to sell them to 
various cosmetic companies. As farmer Eng. Ayoub notes,‖ little irrigation is needed as flowers do 
not require so much water...most of the people are really keen in growing roses rather than poppy 
opium‖ (YouTube video 2008). So far, there have been a lot of examples of alternative livelihoods 
implemented to Afghanistan since 2003. Among various suggestions that would help Afghanistan 
to cultivate licit crops was the idea of licensing Afghan opium. It was suggested by the Senlis 
Council (International Council on Security and Development) in their ―Senlis Council 
Recommendations: U.S. Policy in Afghanistan‖ (Senlis Council 2008) report. According to Senlis 
Council, SOURCE the legalized opium may be used for medical purposes. It is known that there are 
a huge number of people who need the drugs as a medicine (i.e. morphine and codeine).  On the 
first hand, the suggestions of Senlis Council seem to be perfect. For example, there are a lot of 
people who suffer from cancer and for whom morphine would be the only medicine that would help 
not to feel the terrible pain. In general, opium is needed for different medical purposes. On the other 
hand, most of the authors criticized the idea of opium legalization in Afghanistan. As Byrd (2008b) 
argues, the idea of licensing Afghan opium will not be successful due to several reasons: 
1. The rule of law and security in Afghanistan is nowhere near adequate to control production 
of opium. Even India, with a much better security and governance situation, suffers from 
leakages of opium from the licensed into the illicit market (30%) (Mansfield 2001). 
Obviously, in Afghanistan leakages would be only higher. 
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2. The licensed price would be much lower than the price received after cultivation of illicit 
opium. 
3. Only a small proportion of Afghanistan‘s good land is good for poppy cultivation, of the 
current level of production is licensed, the same amount of illicit production could spring up 
within a couple of years.  
Although the idea of licensing opium theoretically could be the best solution for Afghan farmers, it 
is doubtful whether it will work in conditions of insecure state, according to Felbab-Brown‘s 
approach. I believe that in addition to all the mentioned factors, the country would need extra 
money in order to be able to control the fields where licensed opium is to be cultivated. 
There are certain conditions affecting on cultivation of opium. According to GIRoA (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock 2012), the key issues affecting sustainability of livelihoods 
which must be addressed under the Alternative Livelihoods Policy or other policies are as follows:  
1. Insecurity; 
2. Poor Governance; 
3. Global Market Demand; 
3.1 High price of opium 
3.2 Low prices for licit crops  
3.3 Ineffective and inadequate regional border control;  
3.4 Coercion of farmers by the drug mafia to engage in cultivation of narcotic crops; 
4. Inequities in Access to Land and Unsustainability in Access to Water;  
5. Chronic and Endemic Unemployment: This is a major cause of national dissatisfaction, a key 
driver of opium poppy cultivation and migration of seasonal workers from the impoverished 
provinces (i.e., Ghor) to the southern provinces; 
6. Food Insecurity. Under the NPP on ―Food for Life‖, the ARD Cluster will make a serious effort 
to enhance food security though increasing productivity/ha, re-introduction of industrial crops, crop 
diversification and crop intensification.  Referring to the current ARD Cluster emphasis on market-
oriented agricultural production, the study by Kantor and Pain (2011a) indicated that ―stabilizing 
livelihoods and achieving food security would seem to be the first steps before encouraging 
increased market engagement. This means giving subsistence production equal attention in ARD 
programs. For families in more remote regions with fewer viable options for market production, 
improving subsistence production can form part of social protection strategy‖; 
7. Poverty. About 42% (12 million) of the Afghan population live below the poverty line, with per 
capita incomes of 45 cents per day or less. A further 20% of the population (5.7 million) are only 
just above the poverty line and spend the majority of their income on food, indicating a high 
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vulnerability to shocks (Joint FAO/WFP Summary Programme Proposal to the European 
Commission 2008); 
8.  Uncompetitive Nature of Agricultural Products and Lack of Access to Regional Markets; 
9. Lack of Access to Rural Energy and Value Chain Infrastructure; 
10. Risks, Vulnerability and Social Protection.  
As some authors argue, based on socioeconomic research findings (Kantor and Pain, 2011b), the 
alternative livelihoods Policy will focus on the following interventions:  
1. Reducing risks related to the variability of agricultural output; 
2. Improving the quality and quantity of nonfarm employment opportunities;  
3. Expanding the type of financial services provided to include savings and insurance;  
4. Paying attention to the social context and existing inequalities into the design and implementation 
of AL programs; 
5.  Enhancing employment and entrepreneurial opportunities for women. 
As Pain (2012b) argues, donors and government agencies are: 
a. To take greater account of opium poppy cultivation levels when planning programs and making 
investment decisions in rural areas; 
b. Ensure continued substantial and long-term rural investment in regions/ provinces where poppy 
cultivation has been reduced or eliminated, in order to ensure the sustainability of the decrease and 
to facilitate the reestablishment and development of the licit rural economy; 
c. In areas of the country where access and security are good, invest on long-term rural development 
programs focusing on the key priorities of the ANDS; emphasizing local participation and capacity 
building in the development process. 
 
Today Afghan Government continuing its cooperation with International Community in order to 
reduce poppy cultivation. As described in previous chapters, there have been made a lot of effort on 
the way of turning Afghanistan into a poppy-free state. Many scholars criticized anti-drug measures 
within the country; many predict that the level of poppy cultivation will only grow during next 
years. It should be mentioned, though, that opium production has always been part of Afghanistan. 
Growing opium is not a new phenomenon for Afghanistan, in the middle of the 20
th
 century it was a 
part of legal economical activities, such as production of soap or dye. Today it turned to become 
almost catastrophic for a country. 
 
Indeed, the level of opium cultivation reached its highest level last year and it is expected that this 
level could grow. However, analyzing conditions of Afghanistan, scholars make conclusions and 
generalizing situation in the whole country. Perhaps, it is essential to analyze each province, its 
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geographical location and the level of development in order to understand why in certain regions 
the level of poppy still remains on a high level, while others are almost poppy free.   
Although in official reports, statistic is divided by region, but in mass media, documentary films 
and interviews people are usually generalizing success or failure of certain anti-drug measure in 
Afghanistan. Conclusion that implementation of counter-narcotics measures and in particularly 
alternative development to Afghanistan failed would be wrong. First of all, situation is different 
depending on province and today there a number of poppy-free provinces. Although in 2005 
farmers in these provinces cultivated opium in great amounts. As described in my research, there 
have been some programmes that are very successful and bring to farmers as much income as 
opium could bring.  
 
Territory of Afghanistan is quite big and the regions differ from one another. It is essential to look 
separately on every region of the country in order to understand- why implementation of alternative 
development in some regions was successful while failed in others. This step is especially important 
when it comes to implementation of alternative development programmes. As described previously, 
Felbab-Brown sees connection between insecurity, failure of anti-drug measures, underdevelopment 
and political capital of insurgent groups in Afghanistan. These factors are very much connected 
influencing success of work done by International community in the region. Moreover, according to 
Felbab-Brown‘s approach, conditions of modern Afghanistan are good for political capital of 
Taliban. The overall economy of Afghanistan is poor 
 
Additionally, it is also important to remember about geographical conditions of each province. 
Afghanistan is a big country and climate conditions in its Northern and Southern part are not the 
same. 
 
According to the latest statistics of UNODC published in ―Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014‖( 
UNODC 2014a), current picture of poppy cultivation within Afghanistan is following:  
- poppy-free provinces: Jawzjan, Balkh, Kunduz, Takhar (North); Samangan, Bamyan (Central 
Part); Parwan, Pansjhir, Nuristan, Wardar (East); Logar, Paktya, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika (South-
East); 
- provinces with the level of cultivation less than 1000 ha: Baghlan (North-East), Kabul, Kapisa, 
Laghman, Kunar (East), Day Kundi, Ghor (Central Part), Faryab, Hirat (North-West); 
- provinces with the level of cultivation 1001-10000 ha: Badakhshan (North-East); Zabul, Uruzgan 
(South); Badghis (North-East); 
- provinces with the level of cultivation more than 30 000 ha: Nangarhar (East); Farah, Nimroz 
(South-West); Hilmand, Kandahar (South). 
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Comparing statistics of UNODC published in reports in years 2005, 2009 and 2014 (UNODC 
2005d; UNODC 2009; UNODC 2014b), there was following dynamics in level of opium 
cultivation in some Afghan provinces (see Table 2). I compared the provinces that have shown 
changes in level of opium cultivation after 2005 (with the start of implementation of most counter-
narcotic measures to a region). I included only provinces where level of cultivation has been 
changing since 2005, thus showing dynamics of success of anti-drug policies. I have chosen to 
indicate years 2005, 2009 and 2014 in order to show dynamics in level of opium cultivation. In 
order to make a more precise picture about failure or success of certain measures implemented to 
the region, I included only provinces where figures indicating level of opium cultivation differed 
between years 2005 and 2014. Many programmes in 2005 where on their first stage, and the year 
2014 indicates most current situation.  
 
Map 2.  Provinces of Afghanistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Afghanistan Online (http://www.afghan-web.com/geography/provincial_divisions.html) 
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Table 2. Dynamics of poppy cultivation 
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Opium cultivation per province 2005, 2009, 2014 (hectares)
Badakhshan 7,369 557 4204
Badghis 2967 5,411 5,721
Balkh 10,837 0 0
Day-Kundi 2,581 3,002 587
Farah 10,240 12,405 27,513
Faryab 2,665 0 211
Ghor 2,689 0 493
Hilmand 26,500 69,833 103,240
Hirat 1,924 556 738
Jaw zjan 1,748 0 0
Kandahar 12,990 19,811 33,713
Kunduz 275 0 0
Laghman 274 135 901
Nangarhar 1,093 294 18,227
Nimroz 1,690 428 14,584
Nuristan 1,554 0 0
Samangan 3,874 0 0
Sari-Pul 3,227 0 195
Takhar 1,364 0 0
Zabul 2,053 1,144 2,894
2005 2009 2014
 
 
 
 39 
 
 
Overall, according to statistics of opium cultivation given in the Table two, decrease in level of 
opium cultivation within ten years and thus improvement of situation is seen mostly in Northern 
provinces on borders with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In contrast, poppy cultivation increased 
primarily in Southern provinces, as well as in two Eastern and two Western provinces bordering 
Pakistan and Iran. 
 
International Organizations, Development Organizations and NGO‘s working in a field of 
Afghanistan implemented various alternative development programmes to each region. Table below 
indicates some significant projects of international actors (in cooperation with Afghan Government) 
aimed to implement projects as a part of alternative livelihoods programmes in some provinces 
since 2005.  
 
Table 3.  
                Province  Some examples of Crop, 
implemented within the 
framework of alternative 
development programmes and 
examples of alternative 
livelihoods 
 Main (international) actors, 
implementing alternative 
livelihoods 
Badakhshan Fruits (apples, apricots, 
cherries), nuts., improvement 
of economic infrastructure 
USAID, Afghanaid (DFID), 
AECOM. 
Badghis Wheat, fodder crops, pistachio 
trees  
USAID, AECID (Spanish 
Agency for International 
Cooperation and 
Development), PRT 
(Provincial Reconstruction 
Team). 
Balkh Economic revival projects, 
technology development 
approaches  
JDA, TICA (Thailand 
International Cooperation 
Agency), Ministry of 
Agriculture, Irrigation and 
Livestock (MAIL) 
Hilmand Short-time employment, 
improvement of agricultural 
sector, farmer training 
programmes; crops:wheat, 
fruit crops (Grapes, 
pomegranates); cotton  
USAID, UNODC, European 
Comission (ICADRA) 
Hirat Saffron Danish Committee for Aid to 
Afghan Refugees (DACAAR), 
United Kingdom‘s Department 
for International Developmen 
(DFID)  
Jawzjan Programmes aimed to build UNODC 
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water management systems  
Kandahar Short-time employment, 
improvement of agricultural 
sector, farmer training 
programmes; crops:wheat, 
fruit crops (Grapes, 
pomegranates)  
USAID, UNODC, European 
Comission (ICADRA) 
Laghman Improvement of agricultural 
technologies, marketing 
assistance  
USAID, UNODC, European 
Comission (GTZ) 
Nangarhar Fruits, vegetables, oil-roses.  USAID, UNODC, European 
Comission (GTZ) 
Nimroz Projects focused on 
agriculture development, 
livestock; community 
development  
USAID, UNODC, Relief 
International, DFID 
Nuristan Improvements of 
infrastructure along with 
development of agriculture 
PRT, UNODC, USAID 
Samangan Fruits, vegetables, herbs; help 
in getting access to markets 
for carpets and rug producers.  
UNAMA, various NGO‘s 
Takhar Various crops; Agriculture and 
Food Security activities  
UN agencies, ME (Mission 
East) 
 
Sources: USAID 2011; Afghanistan Resolute Support Mission 2010; Mercy Corps, n/d; Chemonics, n/d; UNODC, n/d 
a; UNODC, n/d b; UNODC, 2005d; UNODC, n/d c; Samuel Hall, 2010; Aecom. 
 
Additionally to detailed description of alternative livelihoods as a part of development processes 
previously in the chapter, table aims to give brief overview of some big projects. The main actors 
working in the ground of Afghanistan included UN agencies, European Union, U.S. Agencies and 
various NGO‘s. Overall, billions of dollars have been invested to fight opium illicit economy of 
Afghanistan and help farmers to find licit activities that would bring them sufficient income. 
 
Although, according to statistics above, and despite many years of fight against opium, the level of 
cultivation reached its highest level last year. Does it mean that counter-narcotic strategies that were 
part of security measures of international actors to Afghanistan failed? The answer to this question 
would be rather ―No‖. According to debates of scholars described in Chapter III, many of counter-
narcotic measures (especially eradication) have failed. It would be wrong, though, to generalize the 
whole picture and make conclusions about the counter-narcotic strategies within Afghanistan. As 
can be seen from the graph, the situation in the Northern part is nearly opposite to situation in the 
Southern part of the country. The level of poppy-free provinces and decrease in cultivation of illicit 
crop can lead to a conclusion that counter-narcotic measures in Northern Afghanistan succeed. In 
most of the Southern provinces, though, situation is becoming worse year by year, taking in 
 41 
consideration dramatic change in figures indicating opium cultivation between year 2005 and 2014 
in some provinces (e.g., Hilmand). 
 
Why some anti-drug measures and in particularly alternative livelihood programmes are successful 
in some regions of Afghanistan and do not bring any effect in some regions? This could be 
explained by several reasons and influenced by following factors: 
1) Level of security in each province, stability and presence of insurgent group (―Taliban‖) 
involved in illicit economy and operating vs Government and coalition forces.  Close 
location of some provinces to cities supporting ―Taliban‖ in Pakistan.  
2) Geographical location influencing access to illicit markets. Some provinces border with 
roots convenient to reach narco- markets and traders in Pakistan and Iran.  
3) Climate and geographical conditions of each region. Afghanistan is a big country and 
conditions for cultivating crops, fruits or seeds are not the same within the country. 
1.  Level of security in each province, stability and presence of insurgent group (“Taliban”) 
According to theoretical approach of Felbab-Brown, any counter-narcotic measure and in 
particularly alternative livelihood programmes will bring a positive outcome in conditions of 
insecurity. Indeed, the alternative development programmes require work on various objects within 
the country; farmers training courses take place not just in classrooms but also on fields. Work in 
conditions of conflicts and insecure environment seem to be impossible!  Afghanistan has been 
involved in conflicts for many years, and today its entire territory is somehow affected by various 
conflicts. Insecurity and absence of stability is a good soil for development of insurgent groups, 
such as Taliban. This insurgent group is the biggest terrorist organization operating within the 
country and involved into processes of drug-trafficking. According to the theoretical approach I 
base my research on, Taliban has a positive involvement in Afghan illicit economy and aims to take 
control over the country supporting illicit activities which would strength its military capability and 
political capital (Felbab-Brown 2009g).  Additionally, some scholars such as Giustozzi and Farrel 
believe that in some cases farmers voluntarily support (popular support) Taliban as it acts as a 
protector of farmers‘ stable income (Farrel, Giustozi 2013b).  For example, eradication measures of 
Afghan Government and International actors cause hostile from the side of local people towards 
Government and respect towards Taliban.  
Actors implementing alternative livelihoods face more difficulties with security conditions in 
provinces where conflicts are stronger. Insecurity, presence of insurgent groups fighting versus 
Government and coalition forces cause growth of opium cultivation and in turn low-effectiveness of 
AD programmes. Although, with a start of ―War on Drugs‖ in 2001, military operations took place 
 42 
across the whole country, ISAF‘s coalition spread to Eastern and Southern provinces. The main 
battlefield was Southern Afghanistan.  
Southern provinces such as Hilmand, Kandahar and Nimruz are the leading producers of opium. As 
can be seen on a Table 2, the level of opium cultivation after 2005 in Helmand province arose 
nearly twice.  It has connection with many factors and one of them is conflict between Taliban and 
NATO forces in 2006. The aim of British forces to bring stability to the region and fight against 
opium cultivation did not bring much success and resulted in an extremely high growth of poppy 
production. Conditions of conflict between Taliban and British forces made situation on fields 
tougher. Many houses of locals were destroyed during British Army‘s wide use of hard power 
measures and there have been many cases when farmers showed sympathy not towards British 
army, but Taliban. 
In 2006, British Army arrived to Hemland to fight Taliban‘s local landloard rule. In 2007, after a 
fight in Nawzad district centre, local people turned against British firing their houses. In addition, 
British forces began an eradication campaign which made resistance from the side of locals to rise. 
Moreover, eradication of Ali Abdal Rahman Jan‘s (warlord from Nad-e Ali)  poppy fields in 2008, 
made Taliban to win a respect of local elite (Farrel T., Giustozzi A 2013c). The reason was 
Taliban‘s  protection of farmers‘ and landloards‘  poppy fields. Malkasian, Meyerle and Katt state 
that sympathy towards Taliban  were among religious leaders of communities and families. Taking 
into consideration that opinions of religious leaders are of a high respect in Afghanistan,  for many 
people Taliban was seen not as an insurgent group, but as the Organization that fights for freedom 
of  Land and Belief against  British soldiers. Taliban‘s interest to protect farmers‘ fields can be 
explained by their motivation to get involved in illicit activities. Money received from these 
activities is the main source of group‘s income. 
As Guistozzi (Farrel T., Giustozzi A 2013d) argues,  the ISAF campaign was essential for Sothern 
Afghanistan as it aimed to reduce high level of insecurity and opium cultivation. Analyzing the 
argument of many scholars about connections between security and opium cultivation, though, I 
have come to conclusion that the conflict between Talban and ISAF forces resulted in failure of 
many alternative livelihood measures implemented to Helmand. Comparing to other provinces, 
international actors put more effort investing in Hilmand, Kandahar and Nimruz  to fight opium. 
Presence of British Army aimed to bring stability to the region. Despite this, the figures indicate on  
a significant rise of opium cultivation and thus failure of most of the projects.  Destroyed fields and 
access to normal conditions of life  did not leave farmers room for searching sufficient alternative 
income, but made them to rely on crop easy to grow and profitable.  
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Lately, international forces alliated with Afghan Government  seemed to be succesfull in 
withdrawing Taliban presence and the fight against insurgency. This could be an optimistic sign for 
future of Southern provinces and could perhaps lead to decrease in poppy cultivation. However, 
Taliban forces are still present in the country and provinces such Hilmand, Kandahar and Nangarhar 
are under rescue to be involved in new conflicts between Taliban and Afghan forces. It can be 
explained by geopolitical location of mentioned provinces and their connection to cities where in 
2006-2007 Taliban sended its forces to the Afghan territory from. Franco and Giustozzi (2013) note 
that Pakistani cities Questa and Peshawar played an important role in development and rise of 
―new‖ Taliban. Historically, Taliban has always been supported by Pakistan which was proved by 
Pakistani Major General (retired) Naseerullah Babar who  mentioned this in many of his interviews.  
Peshawar is located on the border with Nangarhar province and connection between two regions is 
strong and Taliban would be seeking the way not to loose its involvement in illicit economies. 
According to statistics, level of opium cultivation in Nangarhar is higher than in neighbouring 
provinces and despite of generous investments in alternative livelihoods, level of poppy cultivation 
significantly increased.  Peshawar and Questa are notorious for being centers of rising Taliban 
movement in 2006. These cities are neighbouring Nangarhar and Hilmand and thus the two 
provinces played a role of ―bridges‖ between Pakistani centres of Taliban and the rest of 
Afghanistan. Due to high concentration of Taliban forces in the South, there is a higher risks of new 
conflicts. 
According to Felbab-Brown‘s approach, insecurity and conflicts, causing destruction of 
infrastructure and illicit activities of insurgent groups are the main reasons why alternative 
livelihood programmes did not succeed in most of the Southern provinces and Nangarhar. 
Additionally to that, provinces on borders with Pakistan and Iran are involved in illicit opium trade. 
Opportunities to get involved in illicit trade and to receive big sums of money encourage farmers to 
grow opium. However, the most important role in trafficking play belligerent groups involved in 
drug-trafficking, as they make the ―product‖ to reach markets abroad.  
 
Geographical location and neighborhood impacts access of some provinces to illicit markets and 
have a very strong connection with security situation. That is the second factor influencing success 
or failure of AL programmes in some provinces. It is much easier for traders establish and control 
roads and illicit markets in conditions of corruption and insecurity.  
 
2. Geographical location of some provinces influencing access to illicit markets 
 
Absence of safety and stability has an impact on opium cultivation. Insecurity and conflicts affect 
failure of alternative livelihood strategies in some provinces. However, drug trafficking which is 
 44 
present in many provinces, make the situation even worse. Drug trafficking and trade as a part of 
illicit economy involves initially belligerent groups profiting from opium. According to Felbab-
Brown‘s political capital model, Taliban‘s strength is dependant on illegal economic activities 
which involve drug trafficking and trade. 
 
Opiates from Afghanistan are being exported to many countries through several roots. All the 
neighboring countries are involved in this type of illicit activities. Heroin from Afghanistan is on 
high demand on illicit markets worldwide, and this makes the drug business to flourish within the 
country. High demand on global markets raises offer from the side of people involved in cultivation 
of crops in Afghanistan.  
The main cities and countries involved in drug trafficking from Afghanistan are the following: 
1) Jalalabad-Kandahar- Hilmend-Iran-Turkey-Europe; 
2) Kunduz-Tajikistan-Russian Federation-Europe; 
3) Peshawar- Chitral- Badakhshan- Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan-Commonwealth of Independent 
States- Europe. 
The main routes are: 
―The Southern Route‖: Afghanistan- Pakistan- SE Asia; 
―The Balkan Route‖: Afghanistan- Iran- Turkey- Southeast Europe-Western Europe; 
―The Northern Route‖: Afghanistan- Central Asia- Russia- Western Europe (Organized Crime and 
Corruption Reporting Project 2013). 
 
For insurgent groups such as Taliban involvement in drug trafficking is essential as well. Opium 
cultivation as a part of illicit activities is a source of income for farmers, most of whom survive 
thanks to opium. As for Taliban, trafficking of opium makes part of illicit economic activities, and 
thus according to theoretical approach, helps Taliban to build political capital and increase military 
capability, in accordance with Felbab-Brown‘s approach. As Taliban‘s physical resources, freedom 
of action and political capital is spread on the territory of the whole Afghanistan, the Organization 
actively involved in all the stages of drug economy and illicit activities bring them high income, 
necessary for well- functioning of the insurgent group. 
 
Drug trafficking in Afghanistan has a very strong connection with the first factor influencing on a 
level of poppy cultivation-security. Insecurity makes illicit activities to flourish. Although most of 
the Afghan provinces involved in illicit activities, Nangarhar, Kandahar, Hilmend, Kunduz and 
Badakhshan are the main regions on the way of trafficking. Southern provinces are bordering with 
Iran and Pakistan notorious for being involved in drug trade and having access to illicit markets 
worldwide. Comparing to provinces in the centre of Afghanistan, some Southern, Western and 
Eastern provinces benefit from their location on border with Iran and Pakistan and are involved in 
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drug trafficking to a greater extent. Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran are the countries of ―Golden 
Crescent‖, which is one of the world regions with highest level of opium cultivation.  
 
Iran and Afghanistan signed ―Strategic Cooperation Agreement‖ on the 1st of August 2012. The 
document is of high importance and among one of its cooperation strategies is fight against drug 
trafficking (Ruttig 2013). Analyzing the outcomes of agreement on the ―Annual International 
Scientific Conference on problems connected to International Cooperation in the field of Narcotism 
and Drug Trafficking‖ (Moscow 2012) scholar Stanislav Ivanov  (Oriental Studies Institute of the 
Russian Academy of  Science) stated that truly existing reality is that in the processes of border 
protection between Iran and Afghanistan involved mostly only Iranian side. They built long border 
fortifications from barbed wire and cement fences. On the side of Afghan Southern provinces there 
is almost no security measures as such. For instance, contrabandists from the province of Nimruz 
bordering with Iran ―throw‖ drugs and arms to the neighboring states through the border. Moreover, 
drug Lords who are in tight connections with Taliban use Afghan asylums living in Iran to transfer 
opium.  
 
Involvement of Southern provinces in drug trafficking is another reason why alternative livelihood 
programmes can not succeed there. As Professor Ivanov notes, at the moment huge network of drug 
producers, cultivators, contrabandists and drug Lords. These well-organized networks bring high 
income, which is essential for insurgent groups. For comparison, income received from alternative 
livelihoods is very low. Moreover, cultivation of opium is quite easy activity and does not require 
much effort and sources. Farmers and other people involved in the drug-trafficking network are not 
motivated to give up their source of easy income. As for Taliban, the group will loose its existing 
power and influence without being involved in illicit activities.  
 
Although the trafficking routes on the Southern part of Afghanistan are the biggest ones within the 
country, this type of illicit activity is present in many other provinces. The situation in the Northern 
provinces of the country is more stable. However, the Badakhshan province on the North-East of 
Afghanistan can also be named an important spot on the map of drug trafficking from and through 
Afghan territory. Looking on Table 2, Badakhshan is located close to poppy-free provinces 
Jawzjan, Bakh, Kunduz, Takhar. Despite this, the level of opium cultivation in Badakhshan is very 
high. Badakhshan is bordering with a Pakistani city of Chitral, notorious for being one of the 
important cities in the chain of drug trafficking to Commonwealth of Independent States and 
further. There is cooperation between traders from Badakhshan and Chitral, and Badakhshan is one 
of the provinces actively involved in illicit trade controlled by Taliban (Попов 2004). 
 Secondly, it can be assumed that Hindu Kush mountains allow contrabandists to smuggle opiates 
―safely‖. Hidden paths of Hindu Kush are a perfect place for trafficking drugs.  
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Overall, the second factor influencing failure of alternative livelihoods programmes in Southern 
provinces of Kandahar, Hilmend, Nimruz, as well as Nangarhar on the East and Badakhshan is 
North-East is geographical location of the provinces allowing them easy accessibility to illicit 
markets in Iran and Pakistan. Cooperation between these regions had been establishing for many 
years and today there is a huge network of people involved in trafficking and selling the product on 
illicit markets. Maintained by conditions of insecurity and underdevelopment, illicit markets 
contribute towards country‘s illicit economy and finding suitable alternative for this region is 
indeed a daunting challenge.  
 
Conflicts, illicit activities involving drug trafficking and opium trade are the factors caused by 
humankind. They are the main reasons of failure or success of alternative livelihoods today, but 
theoretically the situation might change in some decades. On the contrary to the factors caused by 
humans, climate, geographical location, and condition of soils in Afghanistan can not be changed. 
Infrastructure influencing on soils could be built, though. 
 
3. Climate and geographical conditions of provinces 
 
It is extremely important that authors of alternative livelihood strategies take into consideration 
location and geographical indicators of each province. Afghanistan is a huge country and a 
difference between its Northern and Southern parts are enormous. 
 
As can be seen on the Map 3, country is covered by mountains, cliffs, valleys and plateaus. The 
highest mountains are Hundu Kus, located on the North-Eastern part and going down to South-
West. The Map shows that Badahkshan province is located on the highest parts of Hundu Kus. 
Although there are some valleys that can be partly used for cultivation, conditions for developing 
agriculture industry in Badahkshan are very poor. When creating programmes of alternative 
development to the region, authors need not to consider these territories for big agricultural projects. 
Cultivation only of few sorts of crops is possible on the attitude over 6000 meters.  
 
 
Harsh winters are typical for the regions located high in the mountains. Although international 
actors are investing in projects connecting to fruits and nuts cultivation, these project do not bring 
success. This type of agriculture will not develop into big industry sufficient for export, as well as 
will not employ majority of the population.  
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Map 3.  Physical Map of Afghanistan. 
 
 
 
Source: ezilon.com 
 
 
 
Baghis is another province in the North-West part of Afghanistan where despite of implementation 
of alternative livelihoods, level of opium cultivation is increasing. Conditions for crop cultivation in 
Baghis are better than in Badahkshan. However, irrigation channels gradually fade these days. 
There is luck of fresh water not only for harvesting, but also for washing. Before, farmers used 
special water channels (karezez). Irrigated agriculture was destroyed after long years of conflicts. In 
addition, humanitarian agencies report annual droughts in Baghis. In the middle of last year, 
droughts were caused by luck of long rains and thus harvests of wheat and cash crops heavily 
reliable on water failed (Drought Rapid Assessment Report 2014). It can be suggested, that projects 
related to the reconstruction and creation of water channels shall be implemented to the region. 
Increase in poppy cultivation in Baghis was caused by luck of water and sufficient conditions for 
cultivation of other than poppy crops. Opium seed does not require much water and successfully 
blossoms in conditions of drought. 
 
Situation with irrigation is complex in Southern part of Afghanistan as well. Most of the South-
Western provinces are covered by deserts. Irrigating those areas requires a lot of means; otherwise 
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harvests will not bring any fruits. Southern provinces such as Hilmand, Nimruz, Kandahar and 
Farah are located in climatic zones completely different from the ones in Northern part. Main 
characteristic of Sothern provinces is sultry climate. Due to conflicts most of the infrastructure was 
destroyed and resulted in luck of water channels. Because of that, farmers do not rescue harvesting 
licit crops, but rely on unpretentious opium. 
 
On the whole, first of all it is important to establish infrastructure good enough to let implemented 
crops to flourish. Secondly, focus should be made on crops able to bring fruits in various provinces. 
Taking into consideration conditions of country‘s climatic zones, the best crops for Afghanistan 
include wheat, fruits, nuts, barley, beans, pea.  
 
The regions best for cultivation are the provinces in North, for example Herat. Even in the 19
th
 
century, some scholars in the field of geography noted that Herat is to become a fertile province in 
comparison with other provinces. Russian geographer Snesarev travelled across various provinces 
in the end of the 19
th
 century. In his book ―Afghanistan‖ he notes that Afghan soil is not good 
enough for harvesting and the most fruitful lands are located in the Northern parts of Afghanistan. 
Moreover, he believed that Herat province could become the most fertile province (Снесарев 
1921).  
 
Indeed, implementation of alternative development programmes in the province of Herat has been 
the most successful strategy. As described previously in the chapter, industry of saffron production 
in Herat employed many people. Additionally, saffron production industry brings high income that 
can nearly compete with the cultivation of opium. As a result, level of opium cultivation in Herat 
has decreased twice since 2005. 
 
Future of saffron implementation in Herat seems to be promising. In contrast, situation in other 
provinces are much worse. Farmers prefer to cultivate opium, which almost does not require water 
and effort and at the same time brings sufficient income. Afghanistan is a country that does not have 
perfect conditions for cultivation of crops until it has developed infrastructure and sources for 
improvements and changes in the field of agriculture. For example, success of harvest in Southern 
provinces depends on irrigation agriculture. In conditions of the country involved into conflicts and 
illicit activities, processes of building infrastructure seem to be not realistic. 
 
Overall, the vast majority of poppy cultivation is in Southern and some Western provinces. These 
are the most insecure provinces with the less favorable conditions for agriculture. Most of the 
opium comes from Hilmend province, and it is initially connected to absence of security and 
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conflicts. Unless these factors are absent in Afghanistan, probability that alternative livelihoods will 
succeed in Southern provinces is very low. 
 
Many scholars believe that implementing alternative livelihoods in modern Afghanistan is a very 
difficult process. Afghanistan is a country with a high level of insecurity and corruption. I believe 
that implementation of alternative livelihoods will not be successful in a corrupt and insecure state. 
Although international community has undertaken measures to combat opium cultivation, illicit 
economy of the country impacted development of Afghanistan in a great way. One of the main 
reasons of the failure of some counter-narcotic measures is political capital model of illicit 
economies. Taliban is profiting from illicit activities and thus its interest in instability and illicit 
economy is very high. 
 
There is still a long way to go until Afghanistan is a secure, opium-free state. Various measures 
shall be undertaken in order to build a secure opium-free state. As for alternative livelihoods, they 
should be implemented after security conditions in most of the provinces improved; otherwise they 
will not bring good results. It is important that Afghanistan improves its infrastructure in Sothern 
provinces. Government of the country needs to put an effort in order to build factories. There are 
few such factories in Afghanistan in comparison to its neighboring countries. Alternative 
development measures should be implemented only on a third stage, first of all it is essential to 
establish good security conditions within the country and secondly, to invest in improvement of 
infrastructure. 
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Conclusion 
 
Overall, overview of empirical literature on anti-drug policies in Afghanistan and analysis of 
Felbab-Brown‘s ―political capital model of illicit economies‖ approach aimed to answer the 
research question of the Thesis. 
 
Similar alternative development programmes succeed in some regions of Afghanistan and failed in 
other. According to statistical data, the level of opium cultivation in initially Sothern provinces as 
well as in in some Eastern and Western provinces increased. In comparison, situation in some 
Northern provinces have indicated on positive effect. Why anti-drug measures and in particularly 
alternative development strategies implemented to Afghanistan have been effective in some 
provinces and did not bring visible success in other? 
 
The reason of success or failure of counter-narcotics strategies in some provinces are connected to 
the following factors: 
 
1) Conflicts, conditions of insecurity and high level of belligerent groups‘ presence in some 
provinces; 
2) Close location of some provinces  to illicit markets and drug-trafficking roots; 
3) Climate conditions. 
 
Due to conflicts and very low security conditions in Southern provinces of Hilmand, Kandahar, 
Nimruz and Farah level of opium cultivation significantly increased there. Various alternative 
development measures implemented by International and local actors did not bring visible success. 
The high concentration of belligerent groups, their involvement in conflicts and drug-trafficking is a 
complicating factor on the way of implementation of various counter-narcotic measures. 
Additionally to that, the Sothern provinces along with Nangarhar and Badakhshan are located close 
to the illicit markets in Iran and Pakistan. Comparing to the provinces in Central part of 
Afghanistan, they benefit from the location and greater number of people is involved to illicit 
activities. 
 
Additionally to that, climate conditions of many Afghan provinces are not the best ones for 
agricultural activities and hence, for various alternative development programmes.  Climate and 
conditions of soils as complementary factors influencing on success of alternative development are 
very much connected to security conditions. For instance, many Southern provinces are covered by 
dry soil and thus need to be regularly irrigated, but due to conflicts there is no more water channels 
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sufficient enough for eradication of crops. However, due to sufficient enough for saffron cultivation 
climate projects connected to saffron cultivation and production succeed in the province of Herat. 
 
In contrast with Southern provinces, the provinces in Northern part of Afghanistan showed positive 
dynamic in the level of opium cultivation and success of alternative development programmes. 
Balkh, Day-Kundi, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kunduz, Takhar and Samangan provinces currently are among 
the regions with the lowest level of opium cultivation. Moreover, these are the regions where 
alternative development programmes succeed. It can be explained by far location from the main 
battlefields and conflict zones (i.e. Hilmand), relatively more stable security conditions and distance 
from the biggest drug-trafficking roots and illicit markets in Pakistan and Iran. Furthermore, climate 
conditions in Northern provinces are better for agricultural activities rather in South.  
 
The projects of successful implementation of the counter-narcotic measures should be given longer 
time. In conditions of modern Afghanistan, attention should be paid to state-building processes, 
security measures and to improvement of social-economic factors, which is initial for further 
implementation of anti-drug policies to the region. 
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